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How to Slay a Leviathan and other Quests of the Next Political Economy
The link above is to a book I am writing: How to Slay a Leviathan and other Quests of the Next Political Economy.
The books brings fresh, limited government theory to good government studies, which have historically been dominated by big government, bureaucracy advocates with little experience outside academ
kurtisfechtmeyer aT mac DoT com
Dodd Financial Reform: Recipe Included
As with other parts of the New New Deal our leaders are peddling, the Dodd financial reform package is a perfect storm of blame game, confusion, and ignorance. As for reform? Not so much. When principled people on the left (Feingold; Cantwell) join ranks with Republicans against a bill, a Potomac sewer rat (excuse me, vole) is in the house. You have to look deep within the bill for its few redeeming features, and these are unlikely to outweigh certain negative results.
First, the bill barely touches on the mortgage industry at the heart of the financial crisis. Second, despite its populist trappings, its 1400+ pages only works to the favor of those parties rich enough to buy the legal army needed to wade through it and comply. Third, the bill does nothing to address bi-partisan concerns about the last Wall Street "reform" courtesy of Messrs. Sabanes, Oxley and Spitzer. This previous set of good intentions all but killed the small cap public equity market and the venture business that depended upon it. Could we fix that mess first? Take a ticket. How about funding innovation? So last century. Finally, a bill this important should be crafted by brilliant public-minded leaders above the political fray and steeped in real world experience. Instead of Louis Brandeis, however, we get a script written in an echo chamber by HuffPo-reading political staffers, corporate shills, and politicians interested foremost in salvaging their own complicit hides.
In a nutshell: this bill will make the Washington-Wall Street nexus tighter than ever and bailouts (by any other name) more likely.
One of the great historical accidents that favored the American capital industry and our economy generally was that our financial center, New York, and other regional centers such as San Francisco, were physically separated from the tinkering (however well intentioned) and envies of Washington. No more. This bill takes another step toward a continental regime of capital + cronies -- Athens circa 2010 by way of Chicago circa 1930. The bill also spins the nausea-inducing yarn that the financial crisis was the result of "wild speculation" and "exotic instruments" on Wall Street. In fact, the crisis was specifically about $2T of mundane (but fake) AAA mortgage securities supported by (a) shaky insurance via a politically-connected well spring (AIG), which the bill barely mentions, (b) a ratings oligopoly sanctioned by the government with no shortage of the same "experts" this bill further embraces, and (c) a government-sponsored secondary market via Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which this bill ignores entirely.
Why does the bill place new burdens on private equity funds, venture capital, corporate governance, municipal bonds, credit cards and other matters that are non-systemic in nature and had absolutely nothing to do with the sub-prime mortgage crisis? Any more questions before we shoot that canary making noise in the corner? The response to every wrong (perceived or real), is a flat-footed federal agency with too much authority and too little real experience. Instead of applauding the power of well-policed markets and the native interests and intelligence that drive the vast majority of American business and financial leaders, the bill puts the vain courtiers and egoists of the political court in the center of the financial stage, where they'll expect applause no matter how lame their performance. With broad drivel about "consumers" and "risk" empowering new super-agencies, the rule of law will be no match for a new breed of disastrous do-gooders in the vein of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Any more question before we begin another reading of Alice in Wonderland?
Let's roll the tape from Senator Dodd's own committee:
- Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. There is no evidence that a financial crisis driven by inflated housing values represented: "an across-the-board failure to protect consumers". This is convenient fiction at best. A harmful lie at its worst. Any "schemes" involved in the crisis were real estate scams by borrowers, builders, and flippers to speculate locally and/or defraud lenders. Inflated housing values? Thank a strong economy, low unemployment and the same low interest rates and ready credit the government continues to promote.
Certainly, some had the misfortune of hitting the top of the housing cycle and/or used low-down payment, NINJA and other ill-advised reset loans. Individuals also lied on loan applications. But who pushed these instruments, juiced the housing market, and eased loan requirements? The same consumer-focused "affordability" advocates that will likely populate the new agency.
I have suggested Luigi Zingales' debt-for-equity swaps and other real solutions to help consumers caught up in bad timing and a bad economy, but this bill's premise belies all the talk we hear now from liberals about how they support "personal responsibility". These are people buying houses, not digging in dumpsters. We should anticipate diligence from them. This bill WILL certainly mean fewer banks, as less will be able to afford to comply with a new federal blanket of rules. Competition will decrease. Consumers will suffer. The same "affordability" advocates that brought us skyrocketing college and housing costs are not the solution. They are a problem. A gratuitous layer of bureaucracy increases costs and decreases the best protection consumers have: the ability to switch providers.
Far from helping consumers, this bill will have the opposite effect.
- Financial Stability Oversight Council. 9 Mandarins, who will "identify risks" and sweep anything deemed "risky" under the Federal Reserve's purview. Bad Idea. Very bad idea.
Chaired by the Treasury Secretary, this new financial Council of Trent will have strange and surprising powers, intermingling monetary, banking and securities functions in a charged political environment. Mind you, we now have a Treasury Secretary, who gleefully admits he "has never held a real job". But not to worry, according to Dodd's release, a new "Office of Financial Research" will be staffed with "highly sophisticated economists, accountants, lawyers, supervisors , and other specialists" Hmmm. What seems to be missing? How about someone who has actually worked in the securities industry or in banking, and not just a vacuum sealed policy environment. To a Washington bureaucrat, stepping outside in a drizzle is a risk. How on earth will they get the risk/reward balance correct with nothing in play? This is classic central planning myopia that has failed again and again. And what on earth is the person who is supposed to watch the federal treasury doing watching every else's treasure as well?
- Ending too Big to Fail Bailouts. Really? Once you get beyond a few lines stolen from the Tea Party, you find a morass of contradictory provisions that do little to forestall bailout nation and completely ignores the elephant in the room.
In reality, almost all the TARP money that went to banks was paid back soon thereafter, and most banks never wanted it in the first place. Who was actually bailed out to the tune of hundreds of billions? Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Does this bill have anything to do with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? Nada. Zippo. Zilch. There are several dishonest assertions in the bill, but the most disingenuous is the notion that it addresses "too big to fail." By getting Washington all that more in bed with Wall Street, too big to fail really means: you're not connected enough to survive.
Then, the bill proposes a series of half-baked attempts to place proprietary trading, derivatives, hedge funds and private equity funds into one big "suspect" class -- as if any of these are even vaguely related in terms of their risk dynamics and appropriateness for deposit institutions. But don't worry, the Council will sort this out. How? When? Where? Accountable to Whom? The whole construct is ludicrous and smacks of desperation to pass anything and sort out the mess later. Sound familiar?
Does our regulatory regime deserve a makeover? Yes. Does it need a blue ribbon panel of experienced former industry luminaries who love their country and their industry? Maybe. What about a council of Washington mandarins and careerists? No.
- Transparency and Accountability for Derivatives. At long last, we find a provision in the bill that seems to acknowledge something exists that is called a market. Revelation. And perhaps some simple honest policing and transparency would go a long way to making it work better. Hurrah.
Putting aside the misguided analysis about the role of derivatives in the financial crisis, transparent, well-policed markets are an admirable goal of this legislation. If our legislators simply addressed that one element, this would have been a supportable quest. Not surprisingly, this is a provision with actual bi-partisan support, leaving one to wonder why the rest of the bill goes off on an ideological tangent.
- Updating the 40 Act to bring in non-registered public investment vehicles (Hedge Funds) and making sure the role of insurance is understood in securities regulation. Again. No major problem here, but why not look at the whole regime? The hedge fund industry grew up because of the sclerotic nature of 60 year old Investment Company rules. Why not try to understand why the current regulations are so burdensome first? Then, try an overall fix? Isn't this what you should be studying? Isn't this what modernization was supposed to be about? We need MORE funds available to the public, not just a few Fidelity behemoths. See earlier point on Sabanes, Oxley and Spitzer. We need to increase the diversity and activity of equity market participants, not pass rules that stifle the capital markets.
- Credit Rating Agencies. Yes. This is an area that WAS ACTUALLY RELATED to the financial crisis. Of course, without a market-aware approach, it is far from certain that any outcome of this legislation will be positive. The idea of a government actor picking which agencies should provide ratings strikes me as inherently flawed. The reality is that money has to come from somewhere to do the work of rating, and this bill's sop to the plaintiff bar will only increase the cost of research and likely lower its utility. In previous writings, I have proposed something similar to what the National Research Exchange got approved -- a private clearinghouse that handles settlement and establishes mechanisms to avoid conflicts. These are the kinds of measures that could readily get true bi-partisan support and are truly needed changes. Why not focus the legislation on these things? Why bring in the trial lawyers? Why not encourage multiple rating agencies and let smart, institutional investors make their decisions based upon reputation and track record? Again, go ask your mother.
- Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance. Based on nothing more than Paul Krugmanesque Pablum, this bill seeks to federalize state corporate law. I have many issues with state corporate law, but this bill is not the time or place to address these issues. Perhaps a commission on best practices or model codes. Ironically, the anti-shareholder bias of corporate laws coming out of the First New Deal produced the perverse, pro-management incentives we have today. I'm all for strengthening shareholders rights, but these same liberals are jumping up and down about corporate takeovers and want to put private equity and leveraged finance (two major friends of shareholders) into the penalty box. This is an example of the kind of confusion and contradiction that is littered throughout the bill. On the one hand, class warfare rhetoric and a criminalize business and finance mentality borne of envy and ignorance. On the other hand, a few long overdue, but misplaced, changes. Very. Bizarre. Indeed.
- SEC improvements. Ha! This band of miscreants bring up Madoff, who was a major contributor to all their campaigns. The changes suggested are hardly objectionable, but the short shrift they give to the SEC is indicative of the fact (a) they do not trust markets and (b) traditional "Wall Street" had a lot less to do with the crash than the committee reports own rhetoric suggests. This bill envisions a non-market, cryptic uber-Regulator, such as the Federal Reserve, to overlord over all institutions (see below). So much more irony I can hardly take it.
- Securitization. Again, more grating "spin" about companies "selling mortgages to people they knew could not affort to pay them". Excuse me !!! Wasn't that the point of all the affordable housing mandates the government trafficked in? And what about personal responsibility that the majority pretends to talk about now? I dumped my last bonus in to pay down part of my mortgage instead of going on vacations, etc. My neighbor got a principal readjustment and then took off for two weeks to Florida. Why don't you ring up all the behavioral economists and ask them about that "nudge". As for the skin in the game rules, they are not on the face objectionable, but shouldn't institutional investors police this? Shouldn't the market just price up pure agented deals? Again, this is another half-arsed example of a junior staffer that read an article in some weekly news magazine and thought why not? No research. No thought. No discipline. No considered viewpoint. Just a probably dumb idea, we have to live with for the next several decades.
- Municipal Securities. Fair enough. Even a broken clock is right twice a day, and maybe this is one of those times.
- Strengthening the Federal Reserve. This reads like some inside baseball. Or settling some old scores. Tough to tell. The job of the federal reserve in my view is currency. Period. The fed should be subject to full audit. Period. While it is apparent that the $1T purchase of long-dated securities by the Fed in February 2009 accomplished what an ill-conceived TARP could not -- monetize the Fannie / Freddie mess -- we will live to regret the day the Fed believes its new found power should be permanent. With the collapse of the Euro, we now have a Fed that believes monetizing debt might be a palatable solution. In general, this bill heads us in the wrong direction.
Are We At Farce Yet? The Show Trial of Goldman Sachs
What could possibly be more tragic than a 1400 page financial reform bill written by some of the key architects of financial ruin: Chris Dodd, Barney Frank and Timothy Geithner ?
How about a convenient show trial for Goldman Sachs, one of biggest beneficiaries of the bailout these clever men cooked up?
Yes, folks, we are on to the farce portion of the meal.
It was Karl Mark who wrote that history repeats itself: first as tragedy, then as farce. It was tragic when the Bolsheviks slaughtered the ruling elites of Russia. It was a farce when these same Bolsheviks were subject to Joseph Stalin's show trials.
Today, we have a new kind of political show trial in our midst. It follows on the heals of a financial tragedy.
On the one hand, you have a handful of elite, well-connected financial intermediaries and their investing clients that loaded up on smart gimmicks that were too clever by half. These derivatives instruments went poof when underlying real estate values declined more than expected. In a normal world, this would mean those dabbling in these hot potatoes would get burned. But lo and behold, these cats, who are perfectly capable of fattening themselves up for slaughter, were saved from their own idiocy by the bailout of their chief casino on credit -- AIG.
That was the tragedy. It is a tragedy that continues with an effort by Dodd, Frank, Geithner to play house to the Wall Street whales -- for a cut of the take of course.
Now comes word that one of the main beneficiaries of the AIG bailout -- Goldman Sachs -- might have done something that might have looked like something that might be connected to something that could possibly be interpreted as greedy speculation.
I will let the judicial process pass judgment on whether Goldman Sachs hid the ball from some highly sophisticated investors and whether our cop on the street -- the SEC -- owes it to these big wigs to fight the fight on their behalf.
What I do know is that the timing and subject matter has all the earmarks of a show trial meant to distract from a far greater set of sins that took place within the government before, during and after the financial crisis.
Oh Behave Again!
There are two species of behavioral economists - those that mostly ignore classical economic theory and manage to accomplish some interesting tasks and those bent on disproving classical economic theory. The latter often fall in to the same confirmatory fallacy they are apt to criticize in others. Furthermore, they rarely extract the most powerful findings apparent in their research, as they are more hung up on disproving than proving.
The first category are talented observers and usually good reads. The second slip easily in to politicized amateurism.
Unfortunately, with respect to our new ruling class, the second formulation appears to have won the day.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/nudge-nudge-wink-wink
Hart and Zingales - Chicago School 2.0 speaks
Hart and Zingales propose a Risk management methodology for regulators.
I like it, but is it idiot-proof enough for those that we would depend upon to implement it?
O-Care - A Good Government Advocate's Nightmare
As Nancy Pelosi proclaimed: Let's Pass the Bill to Find Out What is In It
Now that the bill has passed, we can check out the pig in the poke.
The essence of O-Care is quite simple: Health insurers are now de facto Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) by virtue of extensive federal regulation of the terms, conditions and comparative rates health insurers can offer. The law tells insurers how to run their business and then offers to pick up the cost where conditions prove uneconomic. Hmmmm. If this all sounds a little dodgy, your instincts are correct. We tried this kind of experiment in housing with GSEs: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were pressed to buy non-economic sub-prime loans dressed up by intermediaries to look respectable via bundling and shaky insurance.
This secondary market "nudge" by the government was a major reason for the bubble and subsequent collapse of the financial system under the weight of $2T of bogus AAA securities. Expect similar results from health insurers who will look a lot like the housing GSEs going forward. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac started with a modest mission to help first time home buyers and morphed into near monopolies in the residential home market ... which then collapsed.
It gets even worse with O-Care. Housing is real property with an underlying intrinsic value unrelated to human behavior. Medical expenses are consumer expenditures with no floors or ceilings and highly susceptible to behavior signals. Extensive regulation will mean only a few "too big to fail" mega-insurers are likely to survive -- and for how long who knows. With fewer competitors, the prices go only one direction: UP. Americans will not put up with rationing, and they have come to expect the best care in the world, so any pretense of cost controls is just that: pretense. O-Care only expands the cancerous dynamics of the third party payer and deploys a few cynical heartstring pullers to create more of a sense of entitlement to be paid for by the ever diminishing "other guy".
And what about HSAs and other consumer-driven ways to reduce costs? They are scheduled to fade in to the sunset. That is Washington: the bad ideas stick around like venereal disease. The good ones just ride off into the sunset like good soldiers who served us well, but whose time is too brief. Instead, we are left with a system that appears to be ready to fail by design, as the individual mandates necessary to pay for the new government mandates whither.
More disturbing is that the comparative effectiveness of medical treatments will not be determined by medical practitioners and their patients, but rather Gucci-garmented lobbyists. If you want your procedure or technology to be validated by "the system", do not bother to win the battle in the marketplace -- at the hospitals, conferences and universities -- make sure to spend your time and money in Washington, where the real decisions will be made about what "works" and what does not work.
Beyond the inevitable failure of central planning, the unavoidable increases in premiums and overall costs, the abdication of personal responsibility and cost control through choice and consequences, and the likely reduction of successful private initiatives, the ultimate victim will be the quality of our health care.
It has only one direction to go and that is DOWN.
If you liked what Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did to the mortgage market and the world financial system, you will LOVE Obamacare.
Ohh Behave !
Dan Ariely (Predictably Irrational) belongs to a wave of authors doing well in airport bookstores with tales of offbeat psychological experiments and “I told them so” observations on the Great Meltdown. But while Black Swan and Blink tip a hat to the dismal science (the “invisible hand” of Taleb's fractal mathematics and surprising precision of Gladwell's subconscious), Ariely demands a tabla rasa on economics.
The raison d’etre of behavioral economics per Ariely is that traditional or neo-classical economists mistakenly assume rational economic actors, whereas neuroscience just can’t stop discovering ways primordial wackiness gets the best of cool headed calculus. Whereas certain emotional traits may be adaptive for a nomadic tribesman spearing both dinner and enemies, they are just so much baggage when calculating costs and benefits in a modern market economy.
And thus it follows that all kinds of hell -- from Enron to Subprime Mortgages -- can break loose without "regulation" (whatever that might entail). If there is any utility in classic economics, Ariely does not let us in on the secret. There is a Da Vinci Code-esque allusion to the lost meaning of Adam Smith and other seminal economists, but if you follow Ariely to his logical conclusion, even the good old supply/demand intersection should be tossed on the scrap heap, along with all the apparently illusory trades on Wall Street.
In fairness, there are several fascinating observations in Ariely’s book, and I would recommend checking out one from the library or borrowing one from a friend. Putting methodological quibbles aside, the problems begin when Ariely uses his amalgam of idiosyncratic observations to generate policy suggestions. Despite his prowess examining judgment and decision making related to chocolates, black pearls, basketball tickets and aroused libertarians, he rivals the most hide bound and assuming economist when it comes to his parenthetical hope for government actor benevolence and competence.
If market actors act irrationally with something valuable at stake, why on earth would you assume that a government actor with (a) nothing at stake, (b) benefiting from sovereign immunity and tenure, and (c) imbued with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force would be anything other than an id-driven psychopath. Not that I believe all, or even a majority of, government actors are as I just described. But if you are building a matrix of possibilities, there's plenty of evidence to fill in at least one such quadrant (Idi Amin, Stalin, Saddam Hussein, Hitler, Caligula, Katherine the Great, not to mention "Going Postal" at the lower echelons).
Ariely's recounting of the financial crisis mysteriously evades reference to existing regulations or the pressures banks faced to make uneconomic loans from those well-intentioned regulators. He also avoids the big question: would Countrywide have made so many low down payment loans if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- two hyper-levered government creations -- had not "nudged" the market by buying bundled versions (RMBSs) in the secondary market, while overlooking shaky default insurance (CDSs)? And this without going in to problems of regulatory capture and evidence of out and out fraud and corruption. Yes, I'm talking Senator Dodd and Freddie Mac board member Rahm Emanuel. A refresher with J.C. Scott might remind Ariely of the cognitive fallacies (and often fantasies) that inhabit the minds of our public servants.
Behavioral economics is a valuable addition to the intellectual landscape, but it has a long way to go before public policy makers should throw away classic economics or just assume their own benevolence. Well-functioning markets have been shown time and again to be good at their main task: price discovery. Like democracy, the genius of a market is not that its makes the best choices, but that it delivers a method to eject the really bad ones.
I also found it probative that many of the experiments Ariely cites deal with status and luxury choices amongst a leisure-imbued set of college students facing little actual consequence or criticism. Perhaps more mundane studies, such as the price of corn tortillas, dishwashers, fasteners or bauxite, and hard penalties for bad choices, would be additive to the overall body of work, if less amusing for undergrads. I am thinking of the opening scene of Ghostbusters where false answers elicit an electric shock. Further, at what point does manipulation and failure to meet SEC-style total disclosure (including omission of material facts) come in to play with these many experiments? Three card monty probably not, but still ...
Bottom line: I would like to see more effort put in to reputation theory by Dan Ariely and economists like him. It IS bad social science to assume markets automatically work (or that they are "free"). But what skews a market? What trust mechanisms are needed to create honesty and transparency? How do you get information in to the market and who pays for that? How do you best police misrepresentation? Ariely teases us with a few trust mechanisms (Chapters 11-12) and mentions transparency in passing, but he does little other than pull a few pedestrian thoughts of the Newsweek genre. Ironically, he heartily acknowledges the failure of the stilted behavioral rules of the kind his regulators traditionally rely upon. I'm not sure the NYT would have permitted him on the best sellers list if they realized his most productive advice would appear to be using the Ten Commandments as a screensaver ...
So let's move on from the playing cards, Hershey kisses, Harry Winston baubles, and busty magazines, and start to get serious about fixing our real markets.
How to Peg Meg?
Recently, I enjoyed some time at Meg Whitman's home, where she was introduced by Mitt Romney and other members of her team. I heard her stump speech and her answer to a handful of questions. I was also able to spend a few minutes with her, her husband, Griff, and some of her team members.
Meg comes across as very genuine -- perhaps a reflection of her minimal time in politics and an absence of the kinds of unfair attacks that produce facades. That genuineness will serve her well, and she would do well to safeguard it and look to develop strong defenders.
On the performance, her stump speech starts slow, and I wouldn't say it had many emotional high points (more on that later). Where she excels in on questions and answers. It seems apparent she has thought deeply about the problems facing California and is intent on solving them in the same manner her Bain-trained analytical mind might approach a challenged company. Of course, the political landscape is strewn with people who have attempted to apply business thinking to government and failed. Leaving that question and answer session, however, one has nothing but confidence that she will be successful in her objectives, as she succeeded after taking the helm of the eBay internet juggernaut.
What might lead Meg to succeed where others have failed ? First, she certainly understands marketing and the ability to persuade (not just command). Many business people have failed because they were not in the persuasion business, but the on time, in place business. In government, persuasion is about the only tool you have, so you better have well-honed marketing capabilities. Second, we are at a time when the most important problems facing the state are business-like problems around our finances and the delivery of fewer services on even fewer dollars. Third, she appears to be a good team builder, and it is a testament to her skills that so many current and former eBay management members appeared at the event. Finally, she has rightly focused and limited her objectives to jobs, reducing spending and education. She has smartly targeted her appeal with those priorities to specific swing (and non-traditional Republican) voting blocks.
So, for my ideals of leadership (the four Ps), Meg scores pretty well: Personnel, check. Priorities, check. Policies, check.
The only remaining question is principles (the first or fourth P, as it would be). She certainly has business / management principles (that would be the Bain Way), but it would be a tremendous advantage for her (and us) for her to communicate her personal principles. Put in Hollywood vernacular, what is the the Meg Whitman character's motivation? What are the core ideas that would animate her to take on such a challenging and thankless job (ask Arnie on that one). I suspects she loves her country deeply -- from her reticent New England roots to her California dynamism and optimism ... but I don't have much to go on there.
If she answers that question clearly and sincerely and in the same genuine manner as the balance of her presentation, she will improve her stump speech and be a tough candidate to beat. All the micro-demographic targeting in the world cannot make up for the answer to that one simple question: why are you doing this?
And if she wins, I trust she'll read F. Hayek and J.C. Scott, if she has not already.
Hail Mary!
Well here is my Hail Mary! pass into the SEC leadership (with copies to Congress and others) on financial reform.
Will someone listen?
WH Financial Reform - Prescription without Diagnosis is Malpractice
Well, here they go again, as RWR would say.
The White House proposes the most extensive changes to our financial regulatory structure in 75 years under the guise of addressing the "root causes" of last year's financial crisis, yet puts out a report that fails to mention any politically inconvenient facts surrounding that crisis, and spends only 1 paragraph of the 85 page report on the actual root cause. Like most of Geithner's other efforts -- TARP 1.5, AIG, PPIP -- it makes up in political hubris what it lacks in seriousness.
In lieu of the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, we get pablum about "supervision" and "regulation" and "consumer protection", along with a core set of proposals that only Washington could love: new layers of bureaucracy (to solve turf disputes and tackle illusory problems), convoluted behavioral rules in the form of ethical codes, a brand spanking new agency with an amorphous "feel good" paternalistic mandate, and the centralizion of power in the two least accountable and transparent institutions (Treasury and the Fed). Moreover, it is stunningly ignorant of market dynamics and places more power and more faith in regulators that have failed in the past with their existing tools. Fool me once, shame on you ...
In lieu of the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, we get pablum about "supervision" and "regulation" and "consumer protection", along with a core set of proposals that only Washington could love: new layers of bureaucracy (to solve turf disputes and tackle illusory problems), convoluted behavioral rules in the form of ethical codes, a brand spanking new agency with an amorphous "feel good" paternalistic mandate, and the centralizion of power in the two least accountable and transparent institutions (Treasury and the Fed). Moreover, it is stunningly ignorant of market dynamics and places more power and more faith in regulators that have failed in the past with their existing tools. Fool me once, shame on you ...
Why are Fannie and Freddie relegated to a single paragraph placeholder, though they represented 75% of the residential mortgage market at the root to crisis? Why no word about the systematic purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of synthetic subprime / Alt-A synthetic mortgage securities to promote the mantra of "affordable housing" and the active encouragement of shaky insurance to support these securities? Hmmm? Perhaps that is because WH Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel sat on the board of Freddie Mac and another WH advisor Holbrooke on AIG (key culprits in this mess), which pumped up the sub-prime businesses of the Sandlers (Golden West) and Pritzkers (Superior), two major WH donors?
One of the opening premises of the report is that financial institutions were "too reliant" on bond ratings. Yes, but whose fault was that? What the report does not say is these bond ratings were issued by three SEC-sanctioned oligopolists, and that our entire current regulatory infrastructure is built upon mandatory recognition of these ratings for purposes of calculating regulatory capital levels. Yes, mandatory regulatory tie do tend to make you reliant. And why were there so many ($2T) of these mislabeled securities? Perhaps a government-sponsored secondary market and assumption of the full faith and credit of the US behind wobbly paper? Pretty obvious systemic flaw wouldn't you say? Yet absolutley no mention of this in the report. Was this because CEO (Franklin Raines), a friend of the WH, playing with another big WH donor, Goldman Sachs, got caught cooking the books to make his $100M+ payday on the taxpayer nickle?
Well the report doesn't mention any of this because that would mean viewing the crisis as largely a function of a government program gone awry versus the more convenient pro-big government meme: those darn capitalists at it again.
The other farcical "root cause" is the "pervasive failures in consumer protection" -- as if people were buying $300,000 homes in the same manner that they bought mislabeled, two week old eggs, and should just be given homeownership with no expectation of due diligence. Yes, people got in to bad loans, took out more than they could safely afford, and bought in at the height of a real estate bubble assuming that prices would continue to rise. But what of the 90%+ who are still paying their mortgages on time? What protection do we get? And how much of the problem was really caused by inappropriate loans that banks and AGs have not already restructured? Perhaps these were loans that could not have been paid under any circumstances and people were caught in a government policy-driven real estate bubble for which no amount of "consumer protection" would have provided immunity.
But there is nothing Washington likes better than tackling illusory problems, because by definition there is no accountability.
But there is nothing Washington likes better than tackling illusory problems, because by definition there is no accountability.
Fortunately, even a broken clock is right twice a day, so perhaps there will be some good that comes out of some of the proposed changes. If that is that is the case, we can rest assured that those salutary elements were inadvertent. More to come as I look for silver linings.
